Named one of the 20 Notable Naval Books of 2011 in the US Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine, May 2012. The War of 1812 between Britain and the United States was fought on many fronts: single ship actions in the Atlantic; a US invasion of Canada, which the Canadians heroically resisted; the burning of the new US capital, Washington, by the British, the President's house subsequently painted white to hide the fire damage; and an unsuccessful attack by the British on New Orleans. The war is usually seen as a draw. However, as this book demonstrates, it was in fact a British victory. The United States achieved none of its war aims, and the peace, concluded in December 1814, met Britain's long-term maritime needs. This book reassesses the war, showing how the British achieved success through an effective commercial maritime blockade which had devastating consequences on the vulnerable, undeveloped US economy. Neutral vessels were included - one of the causes of the war had been the United States' objection to British interference with US ships in Britain's war with Napoleonic France - and Britain's refusal to concede this point enabled the strategy of commercial maritime blockades to be reused by Britain to good effect in subsequent wars, including those of 1914-18 and 1939-45. BRIAN ARTHUR gained a PhD at the University of Greenwich in Britain, following research in the United States which was completed with the aid of a Caird North America Fellowship from the National Maritime Museum in London.

Provocative, well-researched, and cogently argued. [This] is an important work about the critical element of British strategy in the war. It is deeply referenced, strongly argued and a necessary corrective to American myths.

Source: Naval History

This is the most carefully researched book on the effectiveness of the British blockade of the United States during this conflict to have yet been published. Arthur demonstrates how a bold use of sea power, with its advantages of mobility and surprise, can be a very effective weapon. [...] For American scholars, this volume is one to be read, studied, and added to their bookshelves, for it fills a gap in the economic historiography of the War of 1812.

Source: Reviews in History