By the end of the twentieth century, after three decades of its leader's self-proclaimed revolution, Libya found itself at an important junction. The country was starting to emerge from its diplomatic and economic isolation. The multilateral sanctions were suspended in April 1999, and European and other foreign investors were slowly making their way back to Tripoli. It was clear, however, that only a complete lifting of the US sanctions could deliver the kind of economic resurgence and the necessary international diplomatic imprimatur that the regime sought. This could only be accomplished if the Jamahiriyya was taken off the State Department's list of sponsors of state terrorism. The country's economy, beyond the oil sector, remained unproductive and actively involved few of the country's citizens. The infrastructure of the oil sector itself was aging, and Libya needed substantial investment to update it – conservatively estimated from $10-$30 billion in the medium to long term in order to increase its oil production to 3 million barrels per day within a decade. Although the LNOC had attempted to establish itself as a capable manager of the oilfields it had taken over, its officials were the first to admit that the country required international technology and know-how that would enable it to expand production, in part by drilling for oil beyond the Sirt Basin, and offshore.