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4 - How international institutions affect outcomes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Ernest R. May
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Richard Rosecrance
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Zara Steiner
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Summary

A generation ago, Imre Lakatos expounded a theory of scientific progress in the natural sciences. Whether he meant his theory to apply to social science or not, it has proved to be a fruitful point of reference for students of international relations seeking to evaluate their own research programs and compare them with rival programs. Yet the Scottsdale Conference, where papers for this volume were discussed, clearly showed that Lakatos's framework does not provide a clear, operational framework for the analysis of research programs. As David Dessler convincingly argued, the “hard core” of Lakatos's research program cannot be defined, and we do not know what counts as a “novel fact.” It is therefore relatively easy for research programs to avoid being labeled as degenerative. As Dessler also suggested, however, we can tell our stories in Lakatosian terms. Although Lakatos's criteria are ambiguous and his own formulations often contradictory, thinking about whether research programs are “progressive” remains, in our view, a useful way to help us evaluate their relative merits.

It is in this spirit that we engage in the current project. We are not scholars of the philosophy of science, and we are not particularly interested in arcane debates about what Lakatos “really meant” or what he “should have said.” However, we find that his criteria for progressiveness provide sensible, if not unambiguous, criteria for the evaluation of scientific traditions.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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