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6 - Information and competitive tendering

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2009

Gian Luigi Albano
Affiliation:
Senior Economist at the Consip Research Unit, Italy
Nicola Dimitri
Affiliation:
Professor of Economics University of Rome Tor Vergata
Riccardo Pacini
Affiliation:
PhD student in Economics University of Naples, Italy
Giancarlo Spagnolo
Affiliation:
Head of the Research Unit at Consip, Italy: Visiting Associate Professor of Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden
Nicola Dimitri
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi, Siena
Gustavo Piga
Affiliation:
Università degli Studi di Roma 'Tor Vergata'
Giancarlo Spagnolo
Affiliation:
Stockholm School of Economics
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Summary

Introduction

As stressed in the previous chapter by Bajari and Tadelis, it would be optimal for a procurer wishing to buy a sufficiently standardized, and contractually well-specifiable, good or service to elicit competition among potential suppliers. There are, however, many mechanisms she could use to elicit such competition. This chapter discusses and provides practical indications on how to choose between a sealed bid tendering and a dynamic auction to allocate procurement contracts between competing suppliers. It then suggests simple strategies to keep under control the duration of dynamic procurement auctions when this is a concern for the procurer.

A crucial factor to consider in the optimal choice of a tendering format is the nature of uncertainty and the size of different types of costs the selected supplier will face when serving the contract. Therefore we begin with an example of such uncertain costs.

Consider a procurement for cleaning services of a large company's or public administration's buildings. The contract may specify a variety of services including the cleaning of offices, corridors, halls and more demanding tasks such as the sanitation of laboratories. The contract also establishes that the contractor(s) will be paid a fixed amount of money per unit of surface (€/m2) regardless of the nature of the building. Therefore the unit price coincides across categories of surface, whereas the cost of performing the same task in different environments may vary substantially.

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Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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References

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