Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- 1 European Russia in 1914 showing the location of major enterprises
- 2 Urals state ironworks in 1914
- 3 St Petersburg in 1914 showing the location of major shipyards and armaments factories
- Introduction
- Part I Defence imperatives and Russian industry, 1911–1907
- Part II Rearmament and industrial ambition
- 3 The defence burden, 1907–1914
- 4 The economics and politics of industrial recovery
- 5 The armaments industry: the search for identity and influence, 1908–1914
- 6 The economics and politics of defence procurement
- 7 Military preparedness on the eve of the First World War
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies
3 - The defence burden, 1907–1914
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- 1 European Russia in 1914 showing the location of major enterprises
- 2 Urals state ironworks in 1914
- 3 St Petersburg in 1914 showing the location of major shipyards and armaments factories
- Introduction
- Part I Defence imperatives and Russian industry, 1911–1907
- Part II Rearmament and industrial ambition
- 3 The defence burden, 1907–1914
- 4 The economics and politics of industrial recovery
- 5 The armaments industry: the search for identity and influence, 1908–1914
- 6 The economics and politics of defence procurement
- 7 Military preparedness on the eve of the First World War
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies
Summary
Introduction: the economics and politics of Russian rearmament, 1907–1914
The war against Japan and the revolutionary assault on tsarist government left no political institutions unscathed and few shibboleths intact. The war and revolution – a ‘moment of truth’, in the words of Teodor Shanin – had exposed the hollowness of Russian imperial pretensions and underscored the vulnerability of the old regime to popular protest. Military catastrophe might have been expected to induce a prolonged diplomatic retreat. Other things being equal, defeat should have occasioned a distaste and certainly a retreat from anything resembling an active foreign policy. But things were not equal. It is true that leading officials within the old regime counselled moderation in foreign policy. The Ministry of Finances tried to rally support for a policy of restraint in government spending after 1905, which would have restricted the freedom of manoeuvre of the defence departments. But countervailing forces were at work to undermine this policy. France urged its ally to rebuild the Russian army, lest the pressure on Germany diminish. Within the imperial corridors of power, fresh initiatives were also being demanded. A new generation of naval officers seized the opportunity to formulate an ambitious programme for the Russian fleet. Crucially, the Tsar lent his support, backed by advisers who invoked the image of Peter the Great in the cause of naval rearmament. By 1910–12, Russia was committed to the creation of a powerful and modern fleet in the Baltic and the Black Sea.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900–1914The Last Argument of Tsarism, pp. 117 - 160Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994