Historians of late imperial Russia must confront the degree to which the tsarist regime adapted to the consequences of rapid change at home and in the wider world. Economic historians of Russia need to focus on the extent of innovation in the economic system, as well as on the economic consequences of decisions about the allocation of resources. These issues have generated a substantial literature, and this book belongs firmly within a well-established historiographical tradition. The present study demonstrates that the tsarist government embarked on a major programme of reform and rearmament in the aftermath of war and revolution, in order to improve its defence capability, but that the regime proved less adept at addressing the consequences of these policy shifts. Rearmament saddled the old regime with economic and political problems which it was illequipped to handle. Imperial Russia had to deal simultaneously with the tasks of economic recovery, structural change and rearmament; the attempt to reconcile these tasks, in the midst of an international scramble for influence, exposed the fragile foundations upon which the entire edifice rested.

None the less, this book has shown that military and industrial objectives, far from being incompatible, could be reconciled. Rearmament brought recovery for Russia's beleaguered industrialists. Broadly speaking, it encouraged capital investment, generated increased levels of industrial employment and stimulated more modern forms of industrial organization. Profitability provided one criterion of recovery: profits improved dramatically between 1907 and 1914.