In this final chapter I will draw on themes from previous chapters to discuss some of the main criticisms of having international criminal trials for genocide. The main objection is that trials obscure and may impede other important goals, such as reconciliation. Indeed, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has defended itself against critics by claiming that “The Chamber recalls that its fundamental purpose of holding individuals accountable for their conduct is intended to “contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” Thus, the tribunals themselves are aware of the need for international trials to advance multiple goals.

It is often thought that genocide is the easy case in international law. Genocide is so horrific and “evil” that its confrontation through criminal prosecutions of the monsters who perpetrate it is uncontroversial. Yet, many theorists, such as Martha Minow, have argued that criminal trials retard reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide. Minnow has said that “reconciliation is not a goal of trials, except in the most abstract sense.” I will argue that in genocide cases certain kinds of criminal trials can advance rather than retard reconciliation. There are many uses of the term reconciliation, including the idea that any tensions and attendant ill-will between parties is diminished. Instead, I will be discussing what I will call robust political reconciliation, which requires a long-term solution that focuses on reducing complicity.