Introduction

The International Criminal Court came into existence on 1 July 2002. The new Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes; but the Court can only try international crimes committed on or after 1 July 2002. Any national, from any of the more than eighty states that have ratified the Statute of the Court, can be a potential defendant before the new Court. In addition, the Court will have jurisdiction over crimes committed in state parties, even when perpetrated by nationals from states which have not become parties to the Statute. There are further grounds for jurisdiction but we need not dwell on them here. In this contribution I shall remain with the theme of the Nuremberg trials and use these trials as a springboard to explore three concepts which I think may help us to think about the ways in which the new International Criminal Court will operate. The three concepts I wish to explore are: complexity, complicity and complementarity.

Complexity

To understand what I mean by complexity in this context, let us consider some of the fundamental legal innovations of the Nuremberg judgment delivered by the International Military Tribunal. First, the notion of individuals having concrete duties under international law, as opposed to national law, was clearly enunciated, really for the first time, and later accepted by the international community of states. Until the Nuremberg trial, war crimes trials had been held at the national level under national military law.