Commitment and performance

My subject is changing states of full belief. Preliminary to that discussion, it is desirable to make some general remarks about the respects in which changes of states of full belief are under study.

I begin with the assumption that a useful distinction may be made between two kinds of change in full belief:

1. Changes in doxastic commitment.

2. Changes in doxastic performance.

At time t1, X fully believes that Albany is north of New York and that being north of is a transitive relation.

At time t2, X comes to believe fully, in addition to what he believes fully at t1, that Montreal is north of Albany.

At time t3 X comes to believe fully that Montreal is north of New York.

I consider the transition from t1 to t2 to be a change in doxastic commitment, whereas the change from t2 to t3 is a change in doxastic performance without a change in doxastic commitment. Att2, X is already committed to full conviction that Montreal is north of New York. But prior to t3, X does not recognize that his beliefs that Albany is north of New York, that Montreal is north of Albany, and that being north of is transitive commit him to believe that Montreal is north of New York. At t he recognizes his commitment and fulfills the obligation it entails.

In this volume as elsewhere, my attention is focused on changes in doxastic commitment (Levi, 1980s, ch. I, sect.5).