Routine and deliberate expansion

According to an influential tradition in epistemology that includes David Hume and W. V. Quine among its proponents, beliefs are either responses to stimuli or dispositions to such responses. As such they are not, in general, under the control of the believer. Inquirers cannot choose what to believe. Hence, suggesting that changes in belief ought to be evaluated according to principles of rational choice relative to appropriate cognitive goals rests on a misguided voluntarism. Epistemology should be engaged in explaining such responses to dispositions rather than in prescribing norms for choosing beliefs.

In Chapter 2, I indicated that I shall not be focusing on changes of beliefs construed as responses to stimuli or as dispositions to such responses. Such beliefs are doxastic performances that may or may not fulfill doxastic commitments and are not fully under the control of deliberating agents. The topic of this book is revision of doxastic commitments or undertakings. I contend that agents are able to choose how to revise their doxastic commitments and, in this sense, can deliberately change their beliefs.

Nonetheless, we should not conclude that agents always choose or ought to choose directly the changes in belief states (construed as doxastic commitments) they institute, even if they are able to do so. This is especially true in the case of expansions. Expansion may take place in one of two ways: deliberate and routine. In deliberate expansion, the inquirer chooses one of several expansions of his initial doctrine.