In her recent contribution to consideration of Prospects for a Common Morality, Margaret Farley writes that ‘Feminists have understandable reasons both to reject and to promote belief in a common or universal morality’. So many of the ethical writings of feminists, their stirring speeches and declarations, as well as their carefully detailed analyses of the lives of women, rely upon universal claims regarding what is the case about the world as it is, and what ought to be done everywhere about it. Feminists have made use of ethical universalism as a framework within which to grasp more clearly the problems that need to be addressed by women, so that some general description might be given upon which all could agree, and to judge moral and political priorities, so that actions might be undertaken to make things better. In this sense, universalism has served feminist ethics well. There is also, however, a growing recognition within feminism that such universal claims require a methodology in ethical reasoning that is increasingly understood to be itself unethical. Feminists are thus beginning to doubt their reliance upon universalism, and to ask whether it is actually compatible with feminism, and helpful to the lives of women.

That this is one of the significant threads to be taken up from this analysis is becoming increasingly obvious, as feminists seek to understand the full implications of a gender critique of ethics, and to discern the openings which lie ahead for exploration.