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9 - Exclusionary practices: shopping center restrictive covenants

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2011

Kenneth W. Clarkson
Affiliation:
University of Miami School of Law
Timothy J. Muris
Affiliation:
University of Miami School of Law
Donald L. Martin
Affiliation:
University of Miami
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Summary

If an economist finds something – a business practice of one sort or another – that he does not understand he looks for a monopoly explanation.

Officials charged with enforcing antitrust laws are even more inclined [than economists] to find monopoly purposes lurking in unfamiliar or unconventional business practices.

During the past three decades, shopping centers have become the dominant form of organization for retail sales. Although centers differ in such important characteristics as size and the type of goods provided, they share a common form of business organization. In particular, a shopping center comprises “a group of commercial establishments, planned, developed, owned and managed as a unit, related in location, size and type of shops to the trade area that the unit serves; it provides on-site parking and definite relationships to the types and sizes of stores.”

The lease details the relationship between the shopping center developer (an entity usually separate from the individual merchants) and the stores within the center. These leases often contain conditions, restrictions, covenants, and (or) easements that control signs, remodeling, parking, cleanliness, trash removal, and other activities that may contribute to the overall success of the center. Further, at least as recently as the early 1970s, the leases often constrained merchants as to the type of store (e.g., discount stores were often prohibited), goods offered, or other market activities. In addition, most leases require membership in a merchants' association to provide a forum for determining cooperative behavior, hours of business, advertising, and other matters common to all merchants.

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The Federal Trade Commission since 1970
Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior
, pp. 141 - 160
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1981

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