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7 - Unprecedented Actions

The Federal Reserve’s Response to the Global Financial Crisis in Historical Perspective

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2016

Michael D. Bordo
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Mark A. Wynne
Affiliation:
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
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The Federal Reserve's Role in the Global Economy
A Historical Perspective
, pp. 220 - 265
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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