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6 - Abuse of a dominant position: cases and experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2009

Jeroen Hinloopen
Affiliation:
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Hans-Theo Normann
Affiliation:
Royal Holloway, University of London
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Summary

This chapter reviews EU competition cases related to abuses of dominant positions. It then reviews the experimental literature that deals with market dominance. It is concluded that little experimental work has been done and that, hence, the link is weak between competition policy practice and experimental economics in the area of market dominance. The chapter concludes by answering the following three questions: (i) Is there scope for further experiments within the sphere of abuse of dominance? (ii) Is the gap between experimental research results supplied by the literature and the demand of case handlers due to the inherent boundaries of experimental research as such? (iii) What are the lessons for using experimental research in antitrust enforcement?

Introduction

Article 82 of the EC Treaty states that any abuse of a dominant position is prohibited, and mentions four examples of abuses: (i) directly or indirectly imposing unfair prices or other unfair trading conditions; (ii) limiting production or development to the prejudice of consumers; (iii) unequal treatment of trading parties, thereby placing some at a competitive disadvantage; and (iv) making use of tying contracts, hence, forcing unnecessary supplementary obligations on customers. Of course, other price or non-price strategies may be considered an abuse as well.

It is important to note that Article 82 EC does not forbid certain types of behavior as such; only dominant firms are forbidden from using such strategies.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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