John harris's second essay (Chapter 3) depends upon some striking misunderstandings of the positions central to my ‘A philosophical case against euthanasia’ (Chapter 2). These misunderstandings or misstatements are of more than local or personal interest. They are characteristic of euthanasiast attempts to rationalise the sentiments which are the movement's real guide.

Chapter 3 is notable also for its open reliance upon the thought that there are persons who simply ‘should die’. To the notion that there are people who lack the status of ‘persons’, the thought that some innocent people who concededly do have that status nevertheless should die, and so should be killed, adds something equally sinister.

I have not, of course, seen Harris's third essay (Chapter 5). But at the end of the debate readers will, I think, wish to ask: Has Harris offered any clear and settled reason for doubting that all living human beings are people (persons), however disabled? Or for doubting that intention matters to the content of our fundamental rights, and duties of respect? Or that allowing sentiment to preside in these matters will propel us down a slippery slope into fearful oppression of the aged and infirm?