What is the problem of distance in morality? The Standard View holds that this is the problem of whether we have a stronger duty to aid strangers who are physically near to us just because they are physically near than we have to aid strangers who are not physically near (that is, who are far), all other things being equal. A Standard Claim concerning this problem is that to say distance is morally relevant implies that our duty to aid a near stranger would be stronger than our duty to aid a far one.

Notice that the Standard View about the problem of distance in morality concerns only aiding strangers. It is not thought to be a problem of whether we have stronger duties, in general, to those who are physically near. So, for example, the duties not to harm strangers or to keep promises to aid non-strangers are not thought to be stronger to those who are near than to those who are far.

I maintain that the Standard View is not an accurate description of the problem of distance in morality. Why is the Standard View of the problem incorrect? The Standard View conceives of the possibly morally relevant feature of distance as the distance between an agent who can aid and a stranger who needs help. But agents can be near to or far from entities other than a stranger in need of help.