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5 - Induction and Severe Testing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2010

By
Peter Achinstein  and
Deborah G. Mayo
Edited by
Deborah G. Mayo  and
Aris Spanos
Deborah G. Mayo
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Aris Spanos
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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Summary

Although I have offered some criticisms of her views on evidence and testing (Achinstein, 2001, pp. 132–40), I very much admire Deborah Mayo's book (1996) and her other work on evidence. As she herself notes in the course of showing how misguided my criticism is, we actually agree on two important points. We agree that whether e, if true, is evidence that h, in the most important sense of “evidence,” is an objective fact, not a subjective one of the sort many Bayesians have in mind. And we agree that it is an empirical fact, not an a priori one of the sort Carnap has in mind. Here I will take a broader and more historical approach than I have done previously and raise some general questions about her philosophy of evidence, while looking at a few simple examples in terms of which to raise those questions. It is my hope that, in addition to being of some historical interest, this chapter will help clarify differences between us.

Mill under Siege

One of Mayo's heroes is Charles Peirce. Chapter 12 of Mayo's major work, which we are honoring, is called “Error Statistics and Peircean Error Correction.” She has some very convincing quotes from Peirce suggesting that he was a model error-statistical philosopher. Now I would not have the Popperian boldness to say that Mayo is mistaken about Peirce; that is not my aim here.

Type
Chapter
Information
Error and Inference
Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science
 , pp. 170 - 201
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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References

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Peirce, C.S. (1931–1935), Collected Papers, Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P. (eds.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar

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