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4 - Democratic Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

Daron Acemoglu
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
James A. Robinson
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
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Summary

Introduction

In this chapter, we begin to analyze the factors that lead to the creation of democracy. As discussed in Chapter 2, our approach is based on conflict over political institutions, in particular democracy versus nondemocracy. This conflict results from the different consequences that follow from these regimes. In other words, different political institutions lead to different outcomes, creating different winners and losers. Realizing these consequences, various groups have preferences over these political institutions.

Therefore, the first step toward our analysis of why and when democracy emerges is the construction of models of collective decision making in democracy and nondemocracy. The literature on collective decision making in democracy is vast (with a smaller companion literature on decision making in nondemocracy). Our purpose is not to survey this literature but to emphasize the essential points on how individual preferences and various types of distributional conflicts are mapped into economic and social policies. We start with an analysis of collective decision making in democracies, turning to nondemocratic politics in Chapter 5.

The most basic characteristic of a democracy is that all individuals (above a certain age) can vote, and voting influences which social choices and policies are adopted. In a direct democracy, the populace would vote directly on the policies. In a representative democracy, the voters choose the government, which then decides which policies to implement. In the most basic model of democracy, political parties that wish to come to office attempt to get elected by offering voters a policy platform.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • Democratic Politics
  • Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James A. Robinson, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510809.005
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  • Democratic Politics
  • Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James A. Robinson, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510809.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Democratic Politics
  • Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James A. Robinson, Harvard University, Massachusetts
  • Book: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510809.005
Available formats
×