Dynamics of Democracy in Timor-Leste: The Birth of a Democratic Nation, 1999-2012 presents a vivid and panoramic view of an emerging country's attempt to build both a new state and a new democracy simultaneously. Though state-building is, predictably, still underway, Timor-Leste has made remarkable strides towards the construction of a viable democracy. Democratic institutions, such as unions, courts, parties and a free press, remain underdeveloped, but Timor-Leste's freely elected governments and constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of assembly, association and worship are vibrant enough to place the country above the minimal threshold for democracy (Freedom House 2014; Kingsbury 2014b: 187, 193-195). The 2012 parliamentary elections were deemed ‘free and fair’ by ‘internationally recognised standards’ (Kingsbury and Maley 2012) and a United Nation's mission recently described the country as a ‘place of peace, democracy, celebration and optimism’ (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor- Leste [2012] in Swenson 2015).

Given the country's deeply troubled history, even qualified success is a remarkable achievement. When Timor-Leste gained independence in 1999, the deck seemed stacked against democratization. Four hundred and fifty years of Portuguese colonization, plus nearly a quarter of a century of Indonesian annexation, had left the nation with a tiny middle class, few formally educated leaders and one of the poorest economies in the world. The legacies of internal war made the likelihood of successful democratization seem even more remote. The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN), and later on the broad umbrella for the Resistance, the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), had mobilized broad popular support and had eventually secured independence but only at enormous human cost.

The tragedy unfolded in December 1975 when, less than a month after securing independence from Portugal, the country was invaded by Indonesia. FRETILIN's slogan of ‘Independence or Death!’ proved to be much more than political rhetoric as Indonesian forces met with unexpectedly fierce resistance. The official figures for lives lost in the fighting and famine that ensued have been computed as high as 183,000 (CAVR 2005: 9-11) from a population that, by 1975, barely reached 600,000 individuals.

Even when the Indonesian dictatorship led by Suharto fell and a new Indonesian government agreed to let East Timor decide its own fate through a 1999 Referendum, violence continued.