Oslo, Norway, 10 December 1996. In his acceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize that had been bestowed upon him and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dili, Dom Carlos Ximenes Belo, José Ramos-Horta publicly reiterated the Timorese Resistance plan for the territory agreed a few years before which envisaged a three-step process lasting up to 12 years before the issue of self-determination would be directly addressed, and added some elements of their common ‘vision for our country's future’ should the option for independence prevail, including: ‘We will endeavour to build a strong democratic state based on the rule of law which must emanate from the will of the people expressed through free and democratic elections’ (Ramos- Horta 1996). Most observers considered this plan overoptimistic, and very few believed it would be taken as a realistic proposal in the near future. Breaking away from Indonesia was in itself a daunting goal, and building a democratic state perhaps an even more difficult ambition. Yet, three years after the Oslo ceremony, the optimistic proposal had been superseded by a rapid succession of events, and Indonesia had left the territory. One fundamental step had been taken.

The Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese Timor in 1975 had met no significant international resistance, and counted on the complacency if not outright support of major players, none of which ever recognized the short-lived unilateral proclamation of independence staged by one of the nationalist forces, FRETILIN (Fernandes, 2011). Portugal had not relinquished its official status as ‘administering power of a non-autonomous territory’ and deployed efforts to keep the issue of an effective process of self-determination in Timor alive at the United Nations, refusing to accept the fait accompli. But realpolitik at the time of the Cold War – in which the invasion of the eastern part of Timor was but ‘a mere footnote’ (Ramos-Horta 1996) – left an exiguous room for manoeuvre, and the issue was last brought before the UN General Assembly – where Indonesian positions were gaining ground – in 1982. Only the Security Council and the Secretary-General remained active (but not much) in this respect (Carey 2008).

The ‘pebble in the shoe’ that haunted Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (1988-1999) started to grow visible in 1989 when the visit of Pope John Paul II ‘put this little country back on the map’ (Belo 2011) by providing coverage to demonstrations that signified wide-ranging Timorese opposition to Indonesian rule.