James's Promethean pragmatist, being a restless, indefatigable desiresatisfaction maximizer, was seen in Part 1 to be always on the make in his quest to have it all. Toward this end he had to adopt an externalized stance toward worldly objects, since his concern was with successfully manipulating them for his own purposes. His pragmatic theory of meaning and truth supplied him with recipes for successfully riding herd on them. In addition, they served as a univocal methodological reconciler or mediator between the projects and interests of his many different selves, but only a partial reconciler because conflicts still remained between the perspectives of these selves, especially those of the moral agent and the scientist with regard to the issue of determinism and free will as well as bifurcationism. The stronger medicine of a Poobahistic ontological relativism was needed, requiring him never to go anywhere or do anything without being armed with a “qua”-clause. Even the doctrine of Pure Experience, which turned out to be a failed though noble experiment, had a reconciling intent. Poo-bahism, however, will be seen in Chapter 10 to be in conflict with the mystical self's absolutistic outlook, creating the deepest unresolved aporia in James's philosophy, and it will be the task of Chapter 11 to explore ways of resolving it within a broadly Jamesian approach. All of these pragmatic theses about meaning, truth, freedom, and reality were suitable options for the will to believe, James's ultimate Promethean doctrine, as it licenses us to believe in matters metaphysical (and thereby epistemically undecidable) in a manner that will best enable us to have it all.