The racial ensemble, as defined in the preceding chapter, is a system of relations between four distinct objects: the phenotype, the perception of the phenotype, racial ideas, and racial practice. The core or primary object within it is what we have called “racial ideas” or “belief in race”; but we also argue that it cannot be analyzed in complete isolation. Indeed, the failure to conceptualize this ensemble as a whole is what characterizes the major styles of thought on race we have previously criticized. These styles of thought fix our attention on one of the objects in the ensemble as the basis for the conceptualization and analysis of race: on the perception of the phenotype, on racial ideas (which are assimilated to the concept of ideology or discourse), or on racial practice (which is understood variously as racialization or racism). Three subsequent problems are manifested. First, naturally occurring physical differences (e.g. the phenotype) are misconstrued as racial phenomena. Second, race is understood to be an exclusively unreal phenomenon (precisely because it is epiphenomenal). Finally, race is understood to be exclusively real (as some aspect of experience), even if at the same time it is held to be unreal. These are ideal-typical orientations: in reality, all three might appear in a particular style of thought about race.