Until now, we have assumed that actors' individual situations do not change throughout their negotiations. This assumption is rather unrealistic. It is likely that the strength and stability of their domestic support, issue-area needs, and overall capabilities will vary during prolonged negotiations. Such changes may come about through the actors' own efforts because of dissatisfaction with bargaining outcomes, or as a consequence of exogenous shocks.

The possibility that the domestic and international constraints to which bargainers respond might vary – and hence, that bargainers' valuation of outcomes will change – provides the rationale for the four sections of this chapter. First, under what circumstances are actors likely to actively attempt situational changes? Second, upon what resources can they draw to pursue such goals? Third, how might shocks affect their situational constraints? Fourth, what factors constrain actors' ability to successfully use power resources to manipulate their environment?

The first section of this chapter argues that actors dissatisfied with the outcome of a particular game may endeavor to change the game itself by altering their or their opponent's individual situation, and not simply their strategy within a particular game. If they are sufficiently motivated, as indicated by their payoffs, they can draw upon the power resources of international norms and rules, capabilities, and alliances in an effort to fundamentally alter their situation. This possibility of actors initiating change is the topic of the second section.