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9 - Riding on the storm: Mexican debt rescheduling, 1916–1942

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Vinod K. Aggarwal
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Venustiano Carranza rose to power in 1915–1916, but Mexico's revolutionary turmoil continued sporadically until the early 1930s. Still, brief interludes of stability, combined with improved finances and American pressure, led to a number of debt rescheduling agreements during this epoch. None of these agreements lasted for more than a year or two. Unlike most Latin American countries during this epoch, Mexico never received a single additional loan – although it did at times receive important concessions from bondholders on its existing debt. Throughout this epoch, as the leading creditor nation with important interests in Mexico, the American government intervened actively. In 1942, the U.S. played a key role in the negotiations leading to a major debt settlement between bondholders and Mexico. American intervention was driven largely by Mexico's role as a critical supplier of materials and goods to the Allies during the Second World War.

I divide the third epoch of Mexican debt rescheduling into eight periods. In the first and third periods, from 1916 to 1920 and 1923 to 1924, Mexico and its creditors were deadlocked. During the second period, from 1921 to 1922, however, Mexico enjoyed a brief but significant period of stability under Alvaro Obregón. At this time, the bondholders and Mexico came to an agreement that consolidated all of Mexico's debt, and Mexico made some initial payments before quickly falling into default. After Calles's election during the fourth period from 1925 to 1926, Mexico received major concessions from a revision of the failed 1922 accords.

Type
Chapter
Information
Debt Games
Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling
, pp. 237 - 286
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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