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Overview

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Vinod K. Aggarwal
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

If the 1970s are remembered in international finance as the halcyon days of international lending, the 1980s and 1990s will be recalled as the turbulent years of international debt rescheduling. From the Philippines to Brazil to the Ivory Coast, the rescheduling of sovereign loans has become the major occupation – and preoccupation – of international bankers. But this pattern of boom and bust in lending is not unique to this epoch; borrowing cycles have occurred in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The financial crises that the world faced in the 1820s and 1830s, for example, resemble the entanglements of today in many respects. After the French successfully floated indemnity loans in 1817 and 1818, other countries rushed into the borrowing market. Brokers for these loans earned huge profits, which immediately made lending exceptionally attractive. As lenders scrambled to offer funds, many countries in the Americas and Europe leapt to secure loans. In the ensuing melee, countries often misrepresented the intended use of their newly acquired monies. For example, the Greek government easily secured loans by claiming that they would be used to bolster military defenses and keep the country free from Turkish rule. Yet only a portion of the proceeds were used for this claimed purpose:

The greater part went to various intermediaries [such] as the Greek commissioners to pay them for their arduous labors in negotiating the loan, several well-known English Philhellenes, to compensate them for their losses in the falling securities market, Admiral Cochrane to enable him to spend the rest of his life at ease and several Brooklyn shipbuilders to pay them for frigates, most of which never saw service in the cause.

Type
Chapter
Information
Debt Games
Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling
, pp. 1 - 12
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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  • Overview
  • Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley
  • Book: Debt Games
  • Online publication: 02 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609282.002
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  • Overview
  • Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley
  • Book: Debt Games
  • Online publication: 02 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609282.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Overview
  • Vinod K. Aggarwal, University of California, Berkeley
  • Book: Debt Games
  • Online publication: 02 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511609282.002
Available formats
×