High interest rates and the global recession of the early 1980s crippled Argentina's ability to service its mounting debt along with virtually all the third world borrowers. Unlike other debtors, however, the Argentine economy also staggered under the burden of a $3 billion war waged in the South Atlantic against Great Britain in 1982. Apart from its cost, the conflict subsequently pitted Argentina against its creditors, casting a shadow over the first period of debt negotiations, and politicizing Argentina's debt issue in a way that those of Mexico and Brazil were not.

I divide Argentina's external bank debt negotiations into seven periods, beginning with initial bargaining in late 1982 and ending with a Brady Plan agreement in 1992. The first period, from October 1982 to July 1984, encompasses several stop-gap agreements between Argentina and the banks, as well as an accord with the IMF. The next period, from August 1984 to March 1985, found Argentina in negotiations with a somewhat more stable coalition of bankers. Although the game headed for an outcome of medium adjustment and high concessions, in the end the IMF's intervention threw the game into deadlock.

Period three, from April 1985 to December 1985, found Argentina with a short-lived increase in coalitional stability and some adjustment on both the bankers and Argentina's part. The fourth period from January 1986 to August 1987 – marked by bankers' fear of a spreading moratorium – ended with considerable concessions by the bankers but little adjustment by Argentina.