Chapter 2 illustrated how clientelism can work as a vote-getting tool on a mass scale. Local incumbents who so choose can claim credit for the distribution of valued benefits, and citizens, worried about future access to goods crucial to their well-being, will be willing to exchange their political support for these benefits. However, though there are many strategies Argentine mayors can use to make clientelism work, not all local incumbents rely on clientelism in social policy. As the anecdotes that began this book suggest, clientelism in Argentina is widespread, but it is not ubiquitous. Officials in a minority of towns and cities explicitly deny personal responsibility for government programs and opt not to make political ties or behavior a precondition for receiving government benefits. In this chapter, I seek to understand these exceptions: within a single national political environment, why do some local incumbents opt out of clientelism?

My answer to this question relies on what I call the “audience costs” of clientelism. Although clientelism is typically targeted at the poor, there are other, nonpoor citizens in the political environment. The reactions of these nonclients to the practice of clientelism will affect a politician's incentives to rely on the practice. I argue in this chapter that the non-poor are likely to punish clientelist politicians in the voting booth.