So far, it might seem as if I have merely uncriticallyand naively praised Lao cross-border traders’skilfully deployed smallness, through which they blend inwith and actively sustain the larger transnationaldynamics of a rapidly changing borderland, and thatI have thereby mainly focused on success stories.However, my argument should not be misunderstood aspainting an exclusively rosy picture of national andregional neoliberal policies of economic opening-upand cross-border integration, uncritically endorsingexternal visions of regional connectivity such asthe Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Greater MekongSubregion (GMS) or China's BRI.

I agree with Antonella Diana (2013, p. 27) “thatdespite claims of deregulation, trans-border tradeand mobility of ethnic minority border dwellersremain conditional on an unpredictable statemechanism of loosening and tightening.” Diana'sstudy on China's Tai Lue traders at the Sino-Laoborder demonstrates that their “border strategies”are contingent on a “governing pattern ofexperimentation” (Ibid.), enabling but alsodisabling flexible cross-border mobility.Consequently, Diana explains the traders’ rathershort-lived success in the cross-border trade ofrice and corn, from 2004 until mid-2005, throughbeneficial border policies within which theirstrategies could fully unfold. Hence, with theimposition of stricter border regulations andprotectionist measures on the Chinese side in July2005, which worsened in June 2006, the TaiLue-specific border strategies she described wereultimately to no avail, prompting numerous tradersto give up their trade activities.