Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: rethinking corporate governance – lessons from the global financial crisis
- Part I The failure of the market approach to corporate governance
- Part II Ownership, internal control and risk management: the roles of institutional shareholders and boards
- 7 A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders
- 8 Ownership structure and shareholder engagement: reflections on the role of institutional shareholders in the financial crisis
- 9 Board challenges 2009
- 10 Do independent boards effectively monitor management? Evidence from Japan during the financial crisis
- 11 Risk management in corporate law and corporate governance
- Part III Post-crisis corporate governance: the search for new directions
- Index
- References
7 - A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2011
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: rethinking corporate governance – lessons from the global financial crisis
- Part I The failure of the market approach to corporate governance
- Part II Ownership, internal control and risk management: the roles of institutional shareholders and boards
- 7 A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders
- 8 Ownership structure and shareholder engagement: reflections on the role of institutional shareholders in the financial crisis
- 9 Board challenges 2009
- 10 Do independent boards effectively monitor management? Evidence from Japan during the financial crisis
- 11 Risk management in corporate law and corporate governance
- Part III Post-crisis corporate governance: the search for new directions
- Index
- References
Summary
What is wrong with the British and American system is that far too many shareholders, both institutional and individual, do not behave like owners.
The Economist, 5 May 1990.How far have we moved, if at all, from this state described by Rupert Pennant-Rea twenty years ago? The Treasury Committee suggests there has been inadequate progress, if indeed there has been any. The Walker Review of Corporate Governance of UK Banking Industry addresses the policy considerations underlying institutional responsibility which he styles ‘stewardship’.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corporate Governance and the Global Financial CrisisInternational Perspectives, pp. 134 - 143Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
References
2009
2002 Capitalism without Owners Will Fail: A Policymaker's Guide to ReformLondonCentre for the Study of Financial InnovationGoogle Scholar
2009 www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf
2009 http://www.responsibleinvestor.com/home/article/systemic/P1
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