INTRODUCTION

Public voluntary agreements (PVAs) are primarily a US phenomenon. In our view, the separation of power between the executive branch and the legislative branch that is characteristic of the US presidential system has contributed to the emergence of PVAs. In a parliamentary democracy, a single party controls both the executive and legislative functions, making it easier for the executive to issue credible legislative threats. Chapter 7's analysis of negotiated agreements (NAs) is applicable to such situations. In a presidential democracy like the USA, however, such threats are much less credible, as the legislative branch is often controlled by a different party from the executive. Even when a single party controls both branches, executive branch control is limited since legislators and the president are elected in separate elections. In this context, PVAs may play two different roles. In some cases, the executive branch wants to pursue stronger environmental policies but cannot get its proposals through the Congress, and falls back upon PVAs. In other cases, the executive may have little interest in passing new environmental legislation, but may find PVAs a convenient way to reduce legislative pressure for environmental action. In either case, however, PVAs tend to be relatively modest instruments useful in part due to splits between the goals of the executive and the legislative branches.

Chapter 8 presented a framework for comparing the performance of PVAs against that of mandatory emissions control programs such as emissions taxes or emissions permit trading schemes. The chapter characterized PVAs as providing modest subsidies — primarily technical assistance and public recognition — to firms that adopt environmentally beneficial technologies. Our broad conclusion was that voluntary programs are generally likely to produce weaker environmental results than mandatory programs unless there is strong industry political resistance to mandatory policies.