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2 - Problem-Focused Voters and Congressional Accountability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 January 2013

E. Scott Adler
Affiliation:
University of Colorado Boulder
John D. Wilkerson
Affiliation:
University of Washington
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Summary

What [voters are] looking for is someone who solves the problem, not for a solution that happens to be halfway between the two parties.

Rep. Tom Perriello (D-VA; Dionne 2010)

A problem-solving perspective on legislative organization and behavior starts from the same assumption as many legislative theories – that lawmakers are primarily motivated by reelection. Lawmakers may not always be “single-minded” seekers of reelection, but for most getting reelected is paramount to the pursuit of other policy and career goals (Fiorina 1989; Mayhew 1974). Significantly, prior research often portrays lawmakers’ pursuit of reelection as corrosive to the institution’s broader goals. For example, Mayhew argues “if all members did nothing but pursue their electoral goals, Congress would decay or collapse” (Mayhew 1974, 141). A central difference between a problem-solving perspective and many other perspectives is the assumption that voters also care about collective outputs and are willing to hold lawmakers accountable for whether problems in society are addressed. This means that incumbent legislators do have electoral incentives to be concerned about Congress’s collective performance and to support institutions and processes that promote problem solving.

In this chapter and the next, we consider the evidence for this assumption. Until recently, relevant academic research offered little reason to think that the collective performance of Congress mattered to electorally minded lawmakers. However, more recent research suggests that congressional performance has a significant effect on support for the majority party in Congress. In the current chapter, we argue that voters care about problem solving and that their representatives perceive this concern. In Chapter 3, we then build on existing studies to examine the nature of collective congressional accountability. We offer evidence, both in terms of vote share and lawmaker turnover, that incumbents of the majority and minority parties have electoral reasons to be concerned about Congress’s collective performance. Later we will argue that such concerns are central to appreciating why lawmakers support institutions and processes that promote problem solving.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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