COMMITMENT, VALUE, AND MORAL REALISM

In recent years the debates in metaethics over moral realism have been dominated by arguments from the philosophy of science, epistemology, and the philosophy of language. The goal of the present book is to introduce a new voice into the debate as well as a new approach. Rather than directly addressing the question of whether or not moral realism is true, that is, whether moral judgments do indeed represent subject-independent facts, I propose to ask a question which has been forgotten in these discussions, namely, what is at stake in the truth of moral realism? and in doing so to bring in action theory as an active participant in the debate. I examine whether the truth of moral realism makes what one might call a “practical” difference, that is, a difference not just in our ability to explain, but also to retain certain ordinary, moral experiences. To this end, I focus on commitment.

The hypothesis

The central claim is the following: in order to explain commitment and in order for an individual's commitment to remain stable over time and to fulfill its roles in the governance of action, enhancement of self-understanding, and constitution of identity, one must assume the truth of moral realism and so make room for the possibility of moral facts. I thus seek to provide an analysis of commitment and the conditions under which it is possible, and in so doing to offer at the same time an indirect argument for moral realism – the view that moral judgments represent subject-independent facts.