Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 3 - The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The changed constitutional position of India and Pakistan and the loss of the Indian Army had affected the British attitude towards the Suez Canal and the Middle East generally. Communications with Australia and New Zealand could be maintained round the Cape of Good Hope.
–Prime Minister Churchill at the Anglo–American summit conference, Washington, 8 January 1952.Whereas in the past our views on the strategic importance of the Middle East have arisen from its position as the gateway to Asia, we must emphasise that South-East Asia is equally the key to the Middle East from the other side of the door. The fall of Indo-China to Communism, inevitably spreading to Siam and Burma, would give the enemy great influence elsewhere in Asia owing to their control of the vital rice supply, ultimately making the defence of Malaya extremely difficult. The front line of the Cold War in South-East Asia is French Indo-China.
–Report ‘Defence policy and global strategy’ of 9 July 1952 by the chiefs of staff.The related questions of cut-backs in the defence programme and East-West détente, raised by the end of the Attlee prime ministership, were duly followed up by Churchill who returned to Number 10 on 26 October 1951. This chapter highlights South East Asia as what was added by Churchill to the possible détente agenda. There has been historiographical interest in the connection between the perceived importance of Indo-China and the post-war security of Europe.
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- Churchill, Eden and Indo-China , pp. 49 - 80Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2010