Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 4 - The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
On Middle East questions and also generally he said that we should work together but there should be “no collusion.” … He is strongly in favour of the existing E.D.C. plan and army being carried through, and only in the last resort using N.A.T.O. as the means of incorporating a German army… About Korea, he would evidently like to do something new, and when I deprecated the blockade of China, he did not respond.
–Churchill reported to Eden on meeting with President-elect Eisenhower on 6 January 1953.I move over these maps–because that is what one has to do in one's mind.
–Churchill, House of Commons, 11 May 1953.As was once said, La politique c'est l'art du possible. Politics is the art of the possible.
–Eden, House of Commons, 5 November 1953.In early 1952 Prime Minister Churchill succeeded in persuading few cabinet ministers to agree to a French retreat from South East Asia, even in the event that such a withdrawal would be accompanied by a détente rearguard action, given the inconclusive debate over commitments and spending east of Suez. But negotiations on the French war became acceptable to HMG by the turn of 1953 amidst the growing atmosphere of general East-West détente. It has been suggested that Foreign Secretary Eden approached the four-power Berlin Conference of January–February 1954 with principally the German question rather than China or, especially, Indo-China in mind.
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- Churchill, Eden and Indo-China , pp. 81 - 110Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2010