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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2019

Valeria Palanza
Affiliation:
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
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Checking Presidential Power
Executive Decrees and the Legislative Process in New Democracies
, pp. 225 - 238
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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  • Bibliography
  • Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
  • Book: Checking Presidential Power
  • Online publication: 04 January 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108573580.008
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  • Bibliography
  • Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
  • Book: Checking Presidential Power
  • Online publication: 04 January 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108573580.008
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  • Bibliography
  • Valeria Palanza, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
  • Book: Checking Presidential Power
  • Online publication: 04 January 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108573580.008
Available formats
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