Monetary policy is inherently political and 1970s proved a turning point. The US Fed is the focus, while attacks on social democracy and full employment grew, with Eisenhower’s turn to excessive monetary policy; the Eurodollar markets expansion; intransigence and ingenious evasions of Wall St; and, to Minsky, timidity of the Fed to Wall St in the 1960s yet harsh on wage rises. The Vietnam War funding finally had a flat rate surtax under LBJ, rescinded by Nixon. LBJ’s ‘Great Society’ was comparatively pitiful but not his great expansion of effective voting rights (from 60 per cent beforehand). Nixon’s relation with Arthur Burns, Fed Chair 1970 to 1978 is closely scrutinized, so too the President’s dollar float against industrial competitors, Nixon’s war roles, Campaign to Re-Elect the President (CREEP), and his unwarranted claim of ‘fine tuner’ as Bretton Woods collapsed and Wall St further rose. Bank-money took off in the 1970s, data shows. The Nixon-Burns relation was harbinger to ‘independent’ central banks and not, as orthodoxy claims, a typical postwar left-wing ‘politics’, given Nixon’s hatred of McChesney Martin, previous Fed Chair who aided no election. In futile hope of Fed reappointment, Burns gave President Carter worse stagflation while libertarians attacked ‘the Prince’: Carter’s decent state.