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Cases in European Competition Policy
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Book description

Competition between firms is usually the most effective way of delivering economic efficiency and what consumers want. However, there is a balance to be struck. Firms must not be over-regulated and so hampered in their development of innovative products and new strategies to compete for customers. Nor must they be completely free to satisfy a natural preference for monopoly, which would give them higher profits and a quieter life. The economic role of competition policy (control of anticompetitive agreements, mergers and abusive practices) is to maintain this balance, and an effective policy requires a nuanced understanding of the economics of industrial organization. Cases in European Competition Policy demonstrates how economics is used (and sometimes abused) in competition cases in practical competition policy across Europe. Each chapter summarizes a real case investigated by the European Commission or a national authority, and provides a critique of key aspects of the economic analysis.

Reviews

‘This book fills the need for a European companion to the Kwoka and White compendium of economic discussions of US antitrust cases. It will be invaluable both for its substantive discussions and also for the light cast on the ways in which US and EU competition policy are converging and the ways in which they remain distinct.’

Joseph Farrell - University of California at Berkeley and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General with the US Department of Justice

‘This book is essential reading for economist and lawyers alike. Not only does it illustrate the substantial progress economics has brought to bear on competition policy enforcement in Europe, but it also illustrates the challenges and the inherent limits, when it is not properly applied.’

Lars-Hendrik Röller - Humboldt University, Berlin and President of the European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)

'… the volume must … be praised for presenting the economic reasoning behind important competition cases in Europe. This should enable more thorough scrutiny of the Commission's and other authorities' case practice. It should also raise awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of economic analyses in competition law enforcement. Hopefully, the volume will regularly be updated in the same manner as its role model …'

Source: European Competition Law Review

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Contents


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