Chapter 6 focuses on the price Schmitt had to pay to amend his previous exceptionalist jurisprudence, as his institutional theory of the 1930s turned out to be more conservative than his decisionism of the 1920s. He came to identify more clearly and more programmatically the origin of the legal order in the (vicious) circle between institutional practices and their selection on the part of a body of state law officials who oversee the realisation of a societal project devised by a Leader. In this novel framework, the law is deemed to effect a transformation of what is normal within few institutional settings into what is legally binding for the whole population. The chapter first examines Schmitt’s selective use of Maurice Hauriou’s and Santi Romano’s institutional theories and explains how his concrete-order thinking betrayed the institutional tradition in a few important respects. It then focuses on some central features of concrete-order thinking, such as the nature of legal norms and the role of general clauses. The last part of the chapter draws on influential Italian jurist Constantino Mortati’s interpretation of Schmitt’s concrete-order theory as Mortati struggled to elucidate the role of concreteness within post-World War Two constitutional regimes.