Rawls defines conscientious refusal as “noncompliance with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order” (TJ 323). This contrasts with civil disobedience, which he deines as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (TJ 320). Conscientious refusal thus differs – or, strictly speaking, may differ – from civil disobedience in several ways (TJ 324–325).

Unlike civil disobedience, conscientious refusal is not defined as a public act, though the government may know of it. But unlawful omissions may be publicized and their rationales explained, asThoreau did of his tax resistance (Thoreau 1973 [1849], 63–90, 313). Some conscientious refusers may avoid publicity, as Thoreau wisely did in aiding escaped slaves (Harding 1982, 314–317). Rawls calls the latter cases “conscientious evasion” (TJ 324).

A second difference is that the motivating principles of conscientious refusal need not be political; theymight, for example, be religious. But they can be political, as Thoreau’s indeed were. A third difference is that the motivating principles may not be shared with other members of the community – though they might be. A fourth difference is that a principled omission need not be part of an effort to achieve reform. The point of aiding escaped slaves, for example, is to ensure their freedom, not the abolition of chattel slavery. Thoreau’s tax resistance indicates, however, that conscientious refusal can be part of a line of conduct that seeks reform, e.g. by encouraging others to do the same.