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18 - Patent Pools and Related Technology Sharing

from Part IV - Competitor Collaboration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2017

Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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References

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