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15 - Joseph Raz’s Approach to Legal Positivism

from Part III - Central Figures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2021

By
Brian H. Bix
Edited by
Torben Spaak  and
Patricia Mindus
Torben Spaak
Affiliation:
Stockholms Universitet
Patricia Mindus
Affiliation:
Uppsala Universitet, Sweden
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Summary

Bix considers that Joseph Raz might not be willing to accept that legal positivism is a theory, or stance, that is sufficiently well-defined to be captured in a few main tenets, thinking of it rather as a tradition of legal thinkers held together in a rather loose way. Bix focuses his discussion on Raz’s version of the social thesis, the so-called sources thesis, according to which all law is source-based, in the sense that the existence and content of the law is determined using exclusively factual (social) considerations. Bix considers Raz’s two main arguments in support of the sources thesis – the argument from authority and the argument from different functions – as well as certain objections to these arguments put forward by other legal philosophers.

Keywords

Joseph Razsources thesisseparation thesisincorporationauthority (agency)
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 349 - 370
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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