Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Wartime planning
- 2 Armistice and peace conference
- 3 Western Europe from Paris to Brussels, 1919–20
- 4 East central Europe: relief and reconstruction, 1919–22
- 5 From Brussels to Cannes, 1920–2
- 6 From Genoa to the Ruhr, 1922–3
- 7 The first debt settlement and revision of reparations, 1923–4
- 8 The spread of stability, 1923–8
- 9 Reconstructed Europe
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - From Genoa to the Ruhr, 1922–3
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 July 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Wartime planning
- 2 Armistice and peace conference
- 3 Western Europe from Paris to Brussels, 1919–20
- 4 East central Europe: relief and reconstruction, 1919–22
- 5 From Brussels to Cannes, 1920–2
- 6 From Genoa to the Ruhr, 1922–3
- 7 The first debt settlement and revision of reparations, 1923–4
- 8 The spread of stability, 1923–8
- 9 Reconstructed Europe
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The failure of Lloyd George's grand design
Raymond Poincaré, who became French President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs on 18 January 1922, was a politician of a very different stamp from his predecessor Briand, although his policy was not as different as used to be suggested. A lawyer and a Lorrainer, Poincaré mastered his brief carefully, stuck to it doggedly, and was suspicious of improvisation. He disliked conferences and believed that in most of the Allied meetings since 1919 France had been over-persuaded into making unjustified and unrequited sacrifices. In the last few months he had been waiting in the political wings as the man who stood for the strict application of the peace treaty. He now accepted that France was committed to the economic conference – which in a recent newspaper article he had described as a ‘projet théâtral’ – but devoted considerable attention in the next few weeks to ensuring that its scope was precisely circumscribed and to pinning the British government down in order to minimise the risk of surprises.
In a series of notes, interviews and declarations Poincaré insisted that the conference required the most careful preparation and so the opening date must be postponed; and he asked the British to define precisely in writing their position on the interpretation of the Cannes resolution. Existing treaties, he said in a memorandum issued to the press on 31 January, must not be discussed in any way.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990