3 - July–September 1940
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 September 2009
Summary
The US and the British Empire
In face of the surrender of the French the British determined to fight on. In retrospect that seemed a decision almost to go without saying. A compromise with the Germans had, however, not been ruled out. That there was no thought of peace was a myth that Churchill propagated. However, it is also a myth that the decision to fight on was Churchill's alone and that he is to be blamed for the monumental losses that Britain, albeit ultimately on the winning side, was to suffer. Faced with the disasters of May and June, the Cabinet had decided to continue. If there were to be compromise it believed that the terms then obtainable would be unacceptable and that fighting on might put Britain in a better position. There was also the thought, perhaps indeed stronger in Churchill's mind than in others', that the US would enter the war in Europe sooner rather than later. What was important, it seemed, was that Britain should survive the anticipated Battle of Britain and the period up to the US election. If it did the US might enter the war and ensure a victory that otherwise could be won, if won at all, through economic warfare and American supplies and support short of actual entry.
The fall of France alarmed the US. Even if they did not surrender, the British might be defeated.
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- Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War , pp. 123 - 192Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996