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3 - July–September 1940

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2009

Nicholas Tarling
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
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Summary

The US and the British Empire

In face of the surrender of the French the British determined to fight on. In retrospect that seemed a decision almost to go without saying. A compromise with the Germans had, however, not been ruled out. That there was no thought of peace was a myth that Churchill propagated. However, it is also a myth that the decision to fight on was Churchill's alone and that he is to be blamed for the monumental losses that Britain, albeit ultimately on the winning side, was to suffer. Faced with the disasters of May and June, the Cabinet had decided to continue. If there were to be compromise it believed that the terms then obtainable would be unacceptable and that fighting on might put Britain in a better position. There was also the thought, perhaps indeed stronger in Churchill's mind than in others', that the US would enter the war in Europe sooner rather than later. What was important, it seemed, was that Britain should survive the anticipated Battle of Britain and the period up to the US election. If it did the US might enter the war and ensure a victory that otherwise could be won, if won at all, through economic warfare and American supplies and support short of actual entry.

The fall of France alarmed the US. Even if they did not surrender, the British might be defeated.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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  • July–September 1940
  • Nicholas Tarling, University of Auckland
  • Book: Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War
  • Online publication: 16 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522987.005
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  • July–September 1940
  • Nicholas Tarling, University of Auckland
  • Book: Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War
  • Online publication: 16 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522987.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • July–September 1940
  • Nicholas Tarling, University of Auckland
  • Book: Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War
  • Online publication: 16 September 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511522987.005
Available formats
×