Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The legacy of the Munich conference
- 2 March 1939 and the decision to build an eastern front
- 3 The British guarantee to Poland
- 4 The military consequences of British involvement in the east
- 5 The financing of the eastern front
- 6 The Soviet Union: the rejected partner
- 7 August 1939
- 8 September 1939: war in the east
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Appendix 3
- Appendix 4
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
4 - The military consequences of British involvement in the east
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The legacy of the Munich conference
- 2 March 1939 and the decision to build an eastern front
- 3 The British guarantee to Poland
- 4 The military consequences of British involvement in the east
- 5 The financing of the eastern front
- 6 The Soviet Union: the rejected partner
- 7 August 1939
- 8 September 1939: war in the east
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Appendix 3
- Appendix 4
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
While the guarantees offered by Britain to Poland and Rumania were meant clearly to be political gestures, there remains the important question as to whether France and Britain considered making use of these agreements in a military sense. Since these countries had been discussed in the first place in the context of plans for an eastern bloc of anti-German countries it would have been natural for the question of an eastern front to be debated either simultaneously or at least following the assumption of these unusual commitments. Both Britain and France realised that, unaided, Poland could not play the pivotal role of creating an anti-German front in Eastern Europe, either in the political or the military sense. The inability of the politicians and military chiefs to face the consequences of the dilemma remains a conspicuous failing on their part during the period following the granting of these guarantees to Poland and Rumania.
The military consequences of these commitments to defend Eastern states which were earlier debated by the military chiefs were subsequently analysed only during the second stage of the Anglo–French military talks. On the 8th February 1939 the British Cabinet reluctantly accepted the need to open staff talks with the French.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 , pp. 80 - 105Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987