The crisis over Czechoslovakia appeared to have been resolved at the Munich conference, and thus it ceased being an area of British concern. But during the months following the conference and preceding the crisis of March 1939 the British government attempted to regain the initiative in European affairs, notably in relation to Italy and Germany. A noticeable feature of Britain's foreign policy at that time, indeed during the whole of 1939, is its high degree of continuity. Changes did take place and reappraisals were made of both long and short-term British objectives. These were nevertheless usually initiated as a result of a particular crisis or emergency, notably the Rumanian and Polish crises in March 1939 and the subsequent Danzig one in August. In any case the period from September to December 1938 saw few changes in British foreign policy, over which a relative feeling of complacency prevailed.

Chamberlain believed that the Munich conference decisions did offer some basis for European peace. In particular, he saw the Anglo-German Agreement, to which he obtained Hitler's signature during the conference, as a diplomatic success. After the conclusion of the Czechoslovak crisis Chamberlain, supported by Halifax, proceeded to seek the resolution of what he saw as the other outstanding problem in his European policy.