By August 1939 the contradictory nature of the Anglo–Polish relationship had manifested itself in most of the exchanges and arrangements made between them. The incompatability of this partnership was highlighted during August because of the rapid escalation of tension between Poland and Germany, most notably over the issue of Danzig and also because both sides did recognise that war was inevitable in the near future. This realisation of the imminence of a European war did not affect the Polish–British relationship constructively. Each side had earlier recognised the military impotence of their relationship and both had viewed the bilateral agreement as a political gesture. The inevitability of war breaking out accentuated the difference of perspectives that had always existed between Poland and Britain. Understandably Poland was preparing for war to defend her sovereignty if not her very existence, while Britain pensively contemplated the undesirability of German aggression and further aggrandisement at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe.

Most Polish politicians and military leaders sought to reassure themselves of the maximum British commitment to fighting Germany. However, they remained suspicious and fearful that the Danzig crisis would be seized by Britain as an opportunity for a new ‘Munich’. Polish fears had been heightened by the dilatory attitude of both Britain and France made apparent during the staff and financial talks.