No more than two months elapsed between the ending of the first banking crisis and the onset of the second in April 1931. There followed six months of accelerated bank suspensions, deposit losses in failed banks and increased hoarding. Within this six month period we can identify two separate and distinct banking failure episodes: between April and August 563 banks failed with deposits in failed banks totaling $497 million, and between September and October 817 banks suspended with deposits in suspended banks amounting to $747 million. Sixty percent of the 2,293 bank closings in 1931 occurred during the two banking crises. Figure 3.1 shows the geographical density of the failures for the entire year. The amount of hoarding increased about $400 million as measured by Federal Reserve notes in circulation seasonally adjusted in both episodes (see table 3.1). There was a high concentration of bank suspensions in the Chicago Federal Reserve District during the second banking crisis. One–third of all bank suspensions were in the Chicago District and two–thirds of the deposits of failed banks were in the two Districts of Cleveland and Chicago. The source of the initial shock in April we have been unable to identify, but subsequent shocks in June in Chicago and in August in Toledo are easily recognized. We conclude, unlike Friedman and Schwartz, that the second banking crisis was region specific without perceptible nationwide effects.

The onset of the third banking crisis coincides with Britain's departure from the gold standard on September 21, 1931. Bank failures, deposits in failed banks, and increased hoarding immediately accelerated after the British announcement.