Introduction

My concern in this chapter is the place of autonomy within liberalism, understood as a public morality. To what extent is liberal morality necessarily committed to some doctrine of autonomy, and what is the nature of this doctrine? I begin (Section II) by briefly explicating my understanding of liberalism, which is based on the fundamental liberal principle – that all interferences with action stand in need of justification. Section III then defends my first core claim: given a certain compelling view of the nature of moral reasons, the fundamental liberal principle presupposes a Kantian conception of morally autonomous agents. I then consider (Section IV) an implication of the fundamental liberal principle when applied to public morality and the law – that an interference with liberty must be justified to everyone. This public justification principle, I argue, constitutes a version of Kant's categorical imperative; thus liberalism is committed to not only autonomy of the will (Section III) but a substantive morality of autonomy. By the end of Section IV, I will have shown that liberal morality is committed to what may be broadly deemed a “Kantian” conception of moral autonomy.

In Section V, I show how this necessary presupposition of moral autonomy in liberal public morality implies a further commitment to one interpretation of the much-discussed ideal of “personal autonomy.