In the Anglo-American tradition of criminal law, the state cannot convict and punish people for serious offenses merely because they have performed proscribed conduct. Legal guilt requires both that the defendant engaged in illegal behavior and that certain psychological requirements were fulfilled. Traditionally, these requirements have been very difficult to describe and justify. Consequently, they have been highly controversial, both in theory and in application.

This book clarifies and justifies the psychological components of criminal responsibility. It adopts two methodological premises that differentiate it from many prior investigations of these issues. First, it directs primary attention toward the structure of offenses. Historically, many writers have concentrated on the insanity defense, either as an independent concern or as the central piece of the larger puzzle involving criminal responsibility. The book treats the structure of offense elements as the core of the problem, addressing the insanity defense as an ancillary aspect of the broader system of offense elements and defenses. Second, to the extent that psychopathology undermines attributions of criminal responsibility, the book looks to the available information regarding the nature of the dysfunction involved in that pathology in order to advance the analysis of responsibility.

This book is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy at The University of Arizona. Several individuals made diverse and valuable contributions to that dissertation.