Australia's contribution to the war in Iraq in 2003 was carefully calibrated and followed a series of incremental commitments that preceded the actual invasion in 2003. As the junior coalition partner, Australia formulated its own strategic objectives, notably to support the United States and strengthen the bilateral security relationship. On Iraq, the government acted with unanimity, and the CDF, General Cosgrove, tightly controlled Australia's military mission from the outset. This approach reflected remarkable continuity in the form of Australian engagement on military operations far from Australia's shores on ‘wars of choice’ in the post–Vietnam War years. In essence, Cosgrove closely followed Howard's direction to keep Australia's objectives limited.

Operation Pollard

While Australian forces played a prominent role in the war in 2003, their involvement in the region dated back several years. In 1998 Australia's commitment of an SAS combat search-and-rescue force to Kuwait, as part of Operation Pollard, showed support for the United States’ increasingly tough stance against Iraq's President Saddam Hussein. A squadron of SAS troops deployed in mid-February under the command of Major (later Brigadier) Mark Smethurst and soon integrated New Zealand's troop-sized SAS contribution, D Troop into the squadron. The CO of the SAS, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Mike Hindmarsh, and his logistics officer, Major Brad Rickerby, deployed the Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE), and Hindmarsh became commander of the Anzac Special Operations Force (ANZAC SOF). Hindmarsh acknowledged later that this was a relatively small but strategically important contribution, which enabled the government quickly to demonstrate commitment to the coalition without overextending itself. Not surprisingly, therefore, the nucleus of the ADF's force option for the Iraq war in 2003 was an SAS squadron group deployed as a Special Forces Task Group to the Iraqi western desert. This approach reflected Howard's preference for a ‘quick and clean’ intervention that was ‘in at the pointy end and then out fast’. Such an approach would satisfy American desires for an Australian contribution while conveniently limiting its size and scope.